Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) reasons about how the knowledge of a set of agents changes after true public announcements and after arbitrary announcements of true epistemic formulas. We consider a variant of arbitrary public announcement logic called positive arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL + ), which restricts arbitrary public announcements to announcement of positive formulas. Positive formulas prohibit statements about the ignorance of agents. The positive formulas correspond to the universal fragment in first-order logic. As two successive announcements of positive formulas need not correspond to the announcement of a positive formula, APAL + is rather different from APAL. We show that APAL + is more expressive than public announcement logic PAL, and that APAL + is incomparable with APAL. We also provide a sound and complete infinitary axiomatisation.
Introduction and overview
Public announcement logic (PAL) [13, 17] extends epistemic logic with operators for reasoning about the effects of specific public announcements. The formula [ψ]ϕ means that "ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of ψ". This means that, when interpreted in an epistemic model with designated state, after submodel restriction to the states where ψ is true (this includes the designated state, and 'truthful' here means true), ϕ is true in that restriction. Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) [3] augments this with operators for quantifying over public announcements. The formula ϕ means that "ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of any formula that does not contain ".
Quantifying over the communication of information as in APAL has applications to epistemic protocol synthesis, where we wish to achieve epistemic goals by communicating information to agents, but where we do not know of a specific protocol that will achieve the goal, and where we may not even know if such a protocol exists. In principle, synthesis problems can be solved by specifying them as formulas in the logic, and applying model-checking or satisfiability procedures. However in the case of APAL, while there is a PSPACE-complete model-checking procedure [1] , the satisfiability problem is undecidable in the presence of multiple agents [12] .
We consider a variant of APAL called positive arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL + ), we obtain various semantic results relating refinements to positive formulas, we give various rather surprising expressivity results, and we give a non-surprising axiomatization. In APAL the arbitrary public announcements quantify over quantifier-free formulas, that are equivalent to epistemic formulas (basic modal logic). Whereas in APAL + the arbitrary public announcements quantify over quantifier-free positive formulas: formula + ϕ means that "ϕ is true after the truthful public announcement of any positive formula". A formula is positive if, roughly, the knowledge modalities are never bound by negations. Positive formulas consist only of positive knowledge statements, such as "it is known that", and prohibit negative knowledge statements such as "it is not known that" and "it is uncertain that". In the standard translation, such formulas correspond to the universal fragment.
The restriction to positive formulas is natural in view of possible applications. There are many protocols wherein the messages convey that an agent knows an atomic proposition and wherein only the invariants or postconditions require that an agent does not know an atomic proposition. Knowledge of atomic propositions is stable and easy to verify whereas absence of knowledge is fragile and, typically, hard to verify. For example, verifying knowledge is done by direct observation such as witnessing a communication, or by message passing between principals in a security protocol (where messages are considered atomic components), or by reading a time-stamped blockchain ledger [19] . However, verifying that an agent does not know a proposition requires an assumption that there are no private communication channels or clandestine messages, and thus negative knowledge cannot be verified in the same way as positive knowledge. Consequently, quantifying over positive announcements can often be viewed as quantifying over protocols consisting of straightforwardly verifiable information. The decidability of positive arbitrary public announcement logic therefore means that we can answer the question whether it is possible to achieve a particular knowledge state by means of such protocols.
Let us give some other concrete examples. In the alternating bit protocol [16] the communicating agents achieve partial correctness of message transfer by stacking acknowledgements (where 'acknowledge' means 'know'). The internet protocol TCP/IP manages package transfer, taking into account of missing packages and time-outs, again by means of stacked knowledge [18] . In those case there are no concerns involving ignorance, it is a matter of guaranteeing (partial) knowledge. In various security protocols the worst-case scenario is that all messages between principals are intercepted, in other words, that they become public announcements (all aspects of the protocol except private keys may be assumed public). For example, in cards cryptography two communicating agents attempt to learn the card deal without other players (eavesdroppers) learning the card deal (or even any single card other than their own) [11, 22, 10] . The dining cryptographers protocol [9, 21] has semi-public (coin tossing, observed by an agent and its neighbour) and public aspects (announcing bits, depending on the outcome of the coin toss and whether the agent paid for the meal), in order to guarantee an ignorance epistemic goal (who paid for the meal?). The public part consists of positive announcements (namely of known values of bits).
The logic APAL + is decidable. The proof of this result is substantial and of a fairly technical nature and it is therefore reported in a companion paper [24] . As this result puts APAL + in perspective to similar logics, let us summarily sketch the picture. For an in-depth discussion we refer to [24] . With respect to other logics with quantification over announcements, APAL, the related group announcement logic, and coalition announcement logic are all undecidable [2] (and all three are only known to have infinitary axiomatisations), whereas the 'mental model' arbitrary public announcement logic of [8] and boolean arbitrary public announcement logic (BAPAL) [23] are decidable.
As the name suggests, BAPAL has quantification over boolean announcements [23] . This form of quantification is therefore even more restricted than in APAL + . Its axiomatisation is finitary, unlike APAL + , for which we only report an infinitary axiomatisation. From the dynamic epistemic logics that are quantifying over non-public information change, arbitrary arrow update logic [27] is undecidable, whereas the already mentioned refinement modal logic [6] and arbitrary action model logic [14] are decidable. For the last two logics this is an elementary consequence of the fact that they are as expressive as the base modal logic. This is shown with respect to K models (models for arbitrary accessibility relations). In [15] it is also shown that refinement modal logic interpreted on models of the class S5 (where all accessibility relations are equivalence relations; the logic is then called refinement epistemic logic) is as expressive as the modal logic S5.
We hope that the logic APAL + offers a valuable contribution to this already diverse landscape of logics with quantification over information change.
In Section 2 we give an overview of structures and structural notions, such as epistemic model, bisimulation, and refinement, and we present public announcement logic and arbitrary public announcement logic. In Section 3 we give the syntax and semantics of positive arbitrary public announcement logic APAL + . In Section 4 we show that APAL + is PSPACE-complete. In Section 5 we demonstrate that APAL and APAL + are incomparable. In Section 6 we give the complete infinitary axiomatisation of APAL + .
Public announcement logics
We recall definitions and technical results from epistemic logic, public announcement logic [13, 17] and arbitrary public announcement logic [3] . Throughout this contribution, let A be a countable set of agents and let P be a countable set of propositional atoms (or atoms, or propositional variables).
Structural notions
In this subsection we define epistemic models, model restrictions, and various types of bisimulation.
Definition 2.1 An epistemic model M = (S , ∼, V ) consists of a domain S , which is a non-empty set of states, a set of accessibility relations ∼, indexed by agents a ∈ A, where ∼ a ⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation on states (a relation that is reflexive, transitive and symmetric), and a valuation V : S → P(P ), which is a function from states to subsets of propositional atoms (namely those true in that state).
The class of all epistemic models is called
consists of an epistemic model M along with a designated state s ∈ S . A pointed epistemic model will often also be called an epistemic model.
Given two states s, t ∈ S , we write s∼ a t to denote that (s, t) ∈ ∼ a . We write [s] a to denote the a-equivalence class of s, which is the set of states [s] a = {t ∈ S | s∼ a t}. As we will often be required to discuss several models at once, we will use the convention that
be an epistemic model and T ⊆ S . We define the restriction of M to T as M |T = (S |T , ∼|T , V |T ) where:
A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is a bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R, p ∈ P , and a ∈ A the conditions atoms-p, forth-a and back-a hold.
• atoms-p: s ∈ V (p) if and only if s ′ ∈ V ′ (p).
• forth-a: For every t∼ a s there exists
• back-a:
We note that the union of two bisimulations is a bisimulation, and that there is a maximal bisimulation between the states of an epistemic model, which is an equivalence relation, see [5] for such standard notions. We will also require the notions of restricted bisimulation (restricted to a set of atoms Q ⊆ P ) and bounded bisimulation (bounded to a depth n ∈ N). Q-Bisimulations are intended to preserve modal formulas that contain only atoms from Q, whereas n-bisimulations are intended to preserve the truth of formulas ϕ with wherein stacks of epistemic operators have maximal depth n (this notion will be defined later).
Definition 2.4 Let M , M
′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models and let Q ⊆ P be a set of propositional atoms. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is a Q-bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R and a ∈ A, forth-a and back-a hold, whereas atoms-p is only required to hold for all p ∈ Q. If (s, s ′ ) ∈ R then we call M s and M ′ s ′ Q-bisimilar and write
The notion of n-bisimulation, for n ∈ N, is given by defining a set of relations R 0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ R n .
Definition 2.5 Let M , M
′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models, and n ∈ N. A non-empty relation
′ is a 0-bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R 0 and for every p ∈ P , atoms-p holds. Relation R n+1 ⊆ S × S ′ is an (n + 1)-bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R n+1 , for all p ∈ P , and for every a ∈ A:
• atoms-p:
• n-forth-a: For every t∼ a s there exists
• n-back-a:
where in n-forth-a and n-back-a,
Syntax and semantics of public announcement logics
We now define the syntax and semantics of epistemic logic, public announcement logic, and arbitrary public announcement logic.
Definition 2.6
The language of arbitrary public announcement logic L apal is defined inductively as:
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
We will follow the usual rules for omission of parentheses. We use all of the standard abbreviations for propositional logic, and additionally the abbreviations L a ϕ ::= ¬K a ¬ϕ, ϕ ψ ::= ¬[ϕ]¬ψ, and ϕ ::= ¬ ¬ϕ. We also consider the language of public announcement logic, L pal , consisting of L apal without the operator, the language of epistemic logic, L el , consisting of L pal without [·] operators, and the language of propositional logic, L pl , without any modalities. A formula in L el is an epistemic formula, and a formula in L pl is a boolean. The epistemic depth of a formula in L apal counts the number of stacked K a operators (while ignoring the operators), i.e., d(K a ϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1, and
We write v(ϕ) for the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ, where
Lower case Greek letters, possibly primed, are used as formula variables. Definition 2.7 Let M = (S, ∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model. The interpretation of ϕ ∈ L apal is defined inductively as:
A model restriction M|ϕ to a formula ϕ restricts the domain of M to those states where ϕ is true. This is the basis of the semantics of public announcements. We note that ϕ may no longer be true in that model restriction. A typical counterexample is the Moore sentence p ∧ ¬K a p: whenever true, after its announcement it is false.
Whenever M s |= ϕ for all s ∈ S, we write M |= ϕ (ϕ is valid on M), and when M |= ϕ for all M of class S5 , we write S5 |= ϕ and we say that ϕ is valid. 
We further consider public announcement logic PAL and epistemic logic S5 , with the same semantics defined on the languages L pal and L el , respectively. The notation used for modal equivalence in L el is ≡ el (the logics PAL and S5 are equally expressive [17] ).
We continue with elementary results on the relation between bisimulation and modal equivalence.
be image-finite epistemic models (each state has finitely many accessible states). Then
These are well-known results. We observe that they can be generalized to the languages L pal and L apal (i.e., to modal equivalence of pointed epistemic models in the respective logics), as public announcements and arbitrary public announcements are bisimulation invariant operations. The latter was shown in [1] for the logic GAL, but the proof also applies to APAL; see also the similar proof for APAL + in Lemma 3.7, later. Analogous results to Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9 apply to Q-bisimulations when we restrict the language of epistemic formulas to propositional atoms in Q, and analogous results also apply to n-bisimulations. Again, both generalise to the language L pal . However, they do not generalize to the language L apal . This is because in the restricted logical language the arbitrary announcement still quantifies over all propositional variables and
Figure 1: Models used in the proof of Proposition 2.12. The actual states are underlined. We will always assume reflexive and symmetric closure of accessibility relations.
not only over those in Q, and, respectively, because the arbitrary announcement quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large epistemic depth, and not only over formulas of at most the epistemic depth of the formula bound by the arbitrary announcement. We will get back to this after presenting the expressivity results for public announcement logics, next.
Expressivity of public announcement logics
Given logical languages L and L ′ , and a class C of models in which L and L ′ are both interpreted (employing a satisfaction relation |=), we say that L is at least as expressive as
So, 'more' means 'strictly more'. As the combination of a logical language with a semantics given a class of models defines a logic, we also use the expressivity terminology to compare the respective logics. In this work we only consider model class S5 and various languages interpreted on this class, to begin with the different fragments of L apal already defined.
The following expressivity results are shown by Plaza [17] (Proposition 2.10), and by Balbiani et al. [3] (Propositions 2.11 and 2.12). We give the proof of Proposition 2.12 in detail, including an alternative proof (that is not known from the literature), as we will use these methods later when obtaining additional expressivity results for positive arbitrary public announcement logic.
Lemma 2.10 PAL is as expressive as S5 (for single or multiple agents).
Proposition 2.11 APAL is as expressive as PAL for a single agent.
Proposition 2.12 APAL is (strictly) more expressive than PAL for multiple agents.
Proof Suppose that arbitrary public announcement logic is as expressive as public announcement logic in S5 for more than one agent. We note that public announcement logic is also as expressive as epistemic logic S5 . Consider the formula (K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p). Then there exists a formula ϕ ∈ L el that is equivalent to (K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p). There will be some propositional variable q not occurring in ϕ. Consider S5 models M and M ′ as in Figure 1 ; let the underlined states be called s and s ′ , respectively. We note that
. This is a contradiction.
Another proof of larger expressivity does not use that quantifies over arbitrarily many propositional variables but that quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large epistemic depth. It is due to Barteld Kooi. It is relevant to mention this alternative proof here, because we will use a similar technique in Section 5 on the expressivity of APAL + .
Proof Suppose that arbitrary public announcement logic is as expressive as public announcement logic in S5 for more than one agent. Then (again) there exists a formula
be the epistemic depth of this formula. Now consider (see Figure 2 ) model N t . We can see it as some sort of infinite S5 unwinding of model M s : N t is bisimilar to M s . A bisimulation between M s and N t links all the p-states in N to the single p-state in M, and all the ¬p-states in N to the single ¬p-state in N. So, in particular, this bisimulation contains pair (t, s). Now consider a model that is like N t , but cut off at the right-hand side, as in model Figure 2 , where the cut-off is beyond the epistemic depth of ϕ. The rightmost point, let it be v, is the unique world satisfying K a p. Because of that, we can uniquely identify all finite subsets of N ′ t ′ . For example, the next to rightmost point, let it be u, is the unique world where L b K a p ∧ ¬K a p. So the set {u, v} is distinguished from its complement by the formula K a p ∨ (L b K a p ∧ ¬K a p) (and, of course, by the simpler description L b K a p). And so on. Therefore, there is an announcement ψ such that (N ′ |ψ) t ′ is the final depicted model, where we note that, ignoring the value of q, it is the same as the model ( 
The models used in Figure 1 provide typical (counter)examples. We note that
Figure 2: More models used in the proof of Proposition 2.12.
In the language L apal restricted to p, the arbitrary announcement modalities are still interpreted over all atoms P , so they quantify not only over L el formulas only containing atom p but also over L el formulas possibly containing atom q as well.
Similarly, we note that
However, this does not rule out that bounded (to some n) bisimilarity implies bounded modal equivalence in a particular model. This will be used in an expressivity proof comparing APAL and APAL + , later (Theorem 5.4 on page 23).
Positive formulas
The positive formulas are the universal fragment of epistemic logic. They play an important role in our work, also in relation to the structural notion of refinement, that is therefore only defined in this section.
Definition 2.13
The language of positive formulas L + el is defined inductively as:
We note that L + el is a fragment of L el .
Lemma 2.14 Positive formulas are preserved under public announcements:
Corollary 2.15 Positive formulas are successful as public announcements:
Corollary 2.16 Positive formulas are idempotent as public announcements:
These results were shown by van Ditmarsch and Kooi [26] (who also extend the positive formulas with the inductive clause [¬ϕ]ϕ; this preserves all results), going back to van Benthem [20] .
A refinement is a relation that is a generalisation of bisimulation, and that only requires the atoms and back condition to hold. Refinements (in this form) were introduced in [6] .
′ is a refinement if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R, p ∈ P , and a ∈ A, the conditions atoms-p and back-a hold.
There are other notions of refinement. For example, in [5] , simulation is defined with an inclusion requirement for atoms: for each pair (s,
The dual of that notion of simulation leads to a different notion of refinement.
Lemma 2.18
The relation is a preorder on epistemic models.
These results were shown by van Ditmarsch, French and Pinchinat [25] . The relation between positive formulas and refinement is intricate. One important (and unreported) result is as follows. It follows from similar reasoning to Lemma 2.9, but in view of its novelty and because we will refer to it later, we give the proof.
Lemma 2.20 Let M , M
′ ∈ S5 be image-finite epistemic models and let R ⊆ S × S ′ be a relation such that (s, s
Let us now consider back. Let (s, s ′ ) ∈ R and suppose that R is not a refinement. We will derive a contradiction. As R is not a refinement, there is a t ′ with s ′ ∼ a t ′ (i.e., an a-successor t ′ of s ′ ) such that none of the (finite number of) a-successors t 1 , . . . , t n of s is in the relation R with t ′ , i.e., back fails for all of the pairs (t 1 , t ′ ), . . . , (t n , t ′ ). (As ∼ a is an equivalence relation, one of the t 1 , . . . , t n is in fact s, but that does not matter for the proof.) Therefore, using the definition of R, for each t i , where i = 1, . . . , n, there is a
is a positive formula (the positive formulas are closed under disjunction and under K a ). This contradicts our assumption that (s, s ′ ) ∈ R.
Positive arbitrary public announcement logic
In this section we give the syntax and semantics of positive arbitrary public announcement logic APAL + , and we provide some semantic results about the properties of positive announcements and arbitrary positive announcement operators. 
We use the abbreviation + ϕ ::= ¬ + ¬ϕ. The epistemic depth and the set of variables of a formula are defined as before.
apal is defined inductively as in Def. 2.7, but with the following clause for positive arbitrary announcement:
ϕ So, the difference with the semantics for the APAL arbitrary announcement is the part 'for every ψ ∈ L + el ' instead of 'for every ψ ∈ L el '. Validity and modal equivalence (notation ≡ apal + ) are defined as before. The set of validities (the logic) is called APAL
+ . An important observation is the partial correspondence between the results of positive announcements and model restrictions that are closed under refinements, a notion that we will define now. Definition 3.3 Let M = (S , ∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and let T ⊆ S be a set of states. We say that T is closed under refinements in M if and only if for every s, t ∈ S such that M s M t : if s ∈ T then t ∈ T . We say that the model restriction M |T is closed under refinements if and only if T is closed under refinements in M .
Lemma 3.4
The result of any positive announcement is closed under refinements. Proof Let M = (S , ∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and let T ⊆ S be a set of states such that M |T is closed under refinements. Then for every s ∈ T and t ∈ S \ T we have that M s M t . As M is image-finite it then follows from Lemma 2.20 that there exists
el ; for every s ∈ T : M s ϕ; and for every t ∈ S \ T : M t ϕ. In contrast to public announcements, a sequence of positive announcements cannot generally be expressed as a single positive announcement. Proposition 3.6 Arbitrary positive announcements are not composable in S5 , i.e., it is not the case that
Proof We construct a counter-example. Consider model M = (S , ∼, V ) in Figure 3 , where S = {s, t, u, v, w, s Figure 3 ) and so
, and M t ′ M t ′ , then by Lemma 3.4 any positive announcement that preserves s ′ or t (or t ′ ) will also preserve t ′ so any positive announcement that results in L a q will preserve t ′ .
As M s M u ′ then by Lemma 3.4 any positive announcement will preserve u ′ , so any positive announcement that results in L a q will also result in
Again, we note that analogous results to Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9 on bisimulation correspondence also apply to the language L + apal : bisimilarity preserves modal equivalence (APAL + is bisimulation invariant), and on image-finite models modal equivalence implies bisimilarity. As we also consider some variations, we will give the crucial detail to prove the first.
Proof This is a straightforward proof by induction over the complexity of formula (as in [1] ) of the proposition, where it is important that the formula is declared before the two models, i.e., we prove the proposition:
The clause for + ϕ goes as follows.
Step (*) is justified because
Step (**) is justified as follows. Take any pair (t, t ′ ) with t ∈ S, t ′ ∈ S ′ , and M t ≃ M ′ t ′ . Then again, as with (*), by Lemma 2.8 we get that M t |= ψ iff M ′ t ′ |= ψ. This establishes that M|ψ ≃ M ′ |ψ, so in particular that (M|ψ) s ≃ (M ′ |ψ) s ′ . We now use that the induction hypothesis for ϕ not merely holds for epistemic models M s , M ′ s ′ , but for any pair of epistemic models N t , N ′ t ′ , so in particular for (M|ψ) s , (M ′ |ψ) s ′ . (In the formulation of the proposition to be proved, the formula is declared before the models.) We thus conclude that (M|ψ) s ϕ iff (M ′ |ψ) s ′ ϕ, as required.
The above lemma is the analogue of bisimulation invariance for epistemic logic (Lemma 2.8). This analogue does not hold for APAL + when we replace bisimulations with Qbisimulations. This is because in the formula + ϕ, the positive announcements can range over atoms that do not appear in ϕ. It similarly fails for the logic APAL; see the discussion at the end of Subsection 2.3.
A way to guarantee that restricted bisimilarity entails restricted modal equivalence is when the valuation of atoms not in the restriction Q is constant throughout a model, such that it is (obviously) Q-bisimilar to a singleton model I t with that valuation of the atoms not in Q. We note that on singleton models I, + ϕ ↔ ϕ and ϕ ↔ + ϕ are valid for all ϕ ∈ L + apal (no further true announcement will have an informative effect).
Lemma 3.8 Let M s , I t ∈ S5 , I t be singleton, and let Q ⊆ P such that for all p ∈ Q,
Proof The crucial case of the inductive proof is the one for arbitrary announcement. This case proceeds as follows. Let + ϕ ∈ L + apal with v( + ϕ) ⊆ Q ⊆ P : Let M s |= + ϕ. Then in particular M s |= ϕ (the trivial announcement ⊤ is positive). By induction, I t |= ϕ. As I is singleton, I t |= + ϕ.
el (without any variable restriction) such that M s |= ψ. Using the assumption that M s ≃ Q I t , we conclude that the valuation of all atoms in Q must be constant throughout (the to s connected part of) M, because I is a singleton model: any s ′ in M with s ∼ a s ′ is therefore bisimilar to t in I and thus has the same valuation for Q-atoms as s. Therefore, any submodel of M containing s is also bisimilar to I t and in particular (M|ψ) s ≃ Q I t . From the last and I t |= ϕ it follows by the inductive hypothesis that (M|ψ) s |= ϕ. In other words, for all ψ ∈ L + el , M s |= ψ implies (M|ψ) s |= ϕ, i.e., M s |= + ϕ.
Arbitrary positive announcements have the Church-Rosser and McKinsey properties.
We use that, with respect to a given formula, the most informative announcement is the one that reveals the value of all variables occurring in the formula, and we then use Lemma 3.8 above.
Given a state s and a (finite) set of propositional variables Q, we write δ s Q for the conjunction of literals expressing the values of the atoms from Q in s. This is the so-called characteristic formula of the (restricted) valuation in state s. Nowhere in the proofs of Lemma 3.8, Proposition 3.10 and Proposition 3.9 is it used that the announced formulas are positive. Therefore, these proofs equally serve to show that:
This is remarkable, because another result in [3] that was later shown to be incorrect (see the discussion in [4] ) might have affected the validity of original proofs of the ChurchRosser and McKinsey properties. We note that a somewhat similar alternative proof of Church-Rosser and McKinsey for APAL is found in [23] .
We end this section with two fairly obvious results for compactness and for the complexity of model checking, that are similarly obtained for APAL + as for APAL.
A logic with language L is compact if for any Φ ⊆ L, if every finite Φ ′ ⊆ Φ is satisfiable, then Φ is satisfiable. Like APAL, APAL + is not compact.
Proposition 3.12 APAL + is not compact.
This follows from the same reasoning used by Balbiani et al. [3] to show that APAL is not compact. Specifically, under the semantics of APAL + the set of formulas
} is unsatisfiable but every finite subset is satisfiable. (The only difference with the proof in [3] is that instead of 'ψ ∈ L + el ' above it there says 'ψ ∈ L el '.) Any finite subset is satisfiable because the epistemic depth of any given finite set
el } is bounded (or, alternatively, because there must be an atom q ∈ P not occurring in such a given finite set). We then proceed fairly similarly as in the proof of Proposition 2.12.
Model Checking Complexity
We now address the model checking complexity for APAL + . The model checking problem for APAL + , for which we write MC(APAL + ), is as follows: given a finite model M s and ϕ ∈ L + apal , determine whether M s |= ϕ. The model checking problem for APAL + is PSPACE-complete. We adapt the proof given for the PSPACE-complete model checking complexity for GAL, byÅgotnes et al. [1, Theorems 24 & 25] . We note that APAL is also PSPACE-complete, which was shown in [1, p. 74] by an even simpler adaptation of the proof for GAL than our adaptation for APAL + .
be finite epistemic models. There is a unique, maximal refinement R ⊆ S × S ′ from M to M ′ and it is computable in polynomial time.
Proof This follows from similar reasoning used to show that the unique, maximal bisimulation between two models is computable in polynomial time, defining the refinement as a greatest fixed point of a monotone function, however relaxing the forth condition appropriately. Specifically, we define the function f :
• for all p ∈ P , s ∈ V (p) if and only if s ′ ∈ V ′ (p);
• for all a ∈ A, for every
It is clear that the function is monotone (i.e., if R ⊆ R ′ , then f (R) ⊆ f (R ′ )), and that any fixed point of this function is a refinement. Therefore the greatest fixed point will be a unique maximal refinement. The function f can be computed in polynomial time, and at most |S| · |S ′ | iterations will be required to reach a fixed point, so the maximal refinement is computable in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.2 MC(APAL + ) is in PSPACE.
Proof We adapt an alternating polynomial time (APTIME) model-checking algorithm used for GAL [1, Algorithm 1, p. 74]. The main variation required is that we must be able to test whether a submodel can be defined by a positive announcement. From Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 it follows that, in order for a restriction of a finite model to be definable as the result of a positive announcement, it must be closed under refinements. From Lemma 4.1 we can check that this condition is satisfied by first computing in polynomial time the maximal refinement from M to itself, R M , and then proceeding in the obvious manner.
We now present the algorithm, sat, for model-checking in APAL + . The algorithm sat takes as input a finite model M = (S, ∼, V ), some s ∈ S and a L + apal formula ϕ ∈ L + apal that we require to be in what is known as negation normal form. This means that the formula conforms to the syntax ϕ ::
It is clear that all formulas are semantically equivalent to a formula in negation normal form. Using such formulas as input results in a simplification of the algorithm with respect to [1] .
A run of the algorithm halts with either accept or reject. Each case of the algorithm is either existential or universal, where for an existential case to be accepting, one choice must lead to an accepting case, and for a universal case to be accepting, every choice must lead to an accepting case. The algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1.
The proof of correctness follows the argument presented in [1] , and the correctness of the (∀) + ϕ and (∃) + ϕ cases follows directly from Proposition 3.4, Proposition 3.5 and Lemma 4.1, as mentioned above. In particular, the (a) parts of the (∀) + ϕ and (∃) + ϕ cases in Algorithm 1 enforce closure under refinement of the restriction, and the (b) parts of the cases (∀) + ϕ and (∃) + ϕ in Algorithm 1 enforce that the restriction is positive. Since sat can be implemented in polynomial time, MC(APAL + ) is in APTIME, which is equivalent to PSPACE [7] .
Theorem 4.3 MC(APAL
Proof This follows from similar reasoning used to show that MC(GAL) is PSPACE-hard, [1] . The basic approach is to show that instances of the QBF-SAT problem can be solved through model-checking a L + apal formula on an appropriately constructed model. A quantified boolean formula may be given as Ψ = Q 1 x 1 . . . Q k x k ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ), where Q i ∈ {∀, ∃}, x 1 , . . . , x k are propositional variables, and ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a boolean formula. (Following custom in QBF-SAT, the variables are not named p 1 , . . . , p n but x 1 , . . . , x n instead. The notation ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) means that each variable x 1 , . . . , x k binds to all its occurrences, possibly none, in ϕ.) The satisfiability problem for quantified boolean problems (QBF-SAT) is well-known to be the canonical problem for PSPACE-completeness. Given any quantified boolean formula Ψ, we can construct a model, M Ψ x , and a APAL + formula, ψ such that M Ψ |= ψ if and only if Ψ is satisfiable. The model represents each boolean variable x i by a pair of states (x i , 0) and (x i , 1), and also contains an additional evaluation state x, as depicted in Figure 4 . An agent j with a universal relation is unable to distinguish any state. A boolean quantifier Q i may be simulated using a + or + operator, appropriately guarded so that it removes precisely one, respectively both, of (x i , 0) and (x i , 1) from the model. Since the model is finite, and each state has a unique evaluation, this can always be achieved by a positive public announcement. After all the quantifiers have been applied in turn, an agent with the universal relation is able to interpret the boolean formula ϕ, by checking which states remain. The encoding of this formula and the constructed model are polynomial in the size of Ψ, so model-checking APAL + is PSPACE-hard. For details on the construction of M Ψ and ψ see [1] .
Expressivity
In this section we establish various expressivity results, mainly that (for more than one agent) APAL + is more expressive than S5 (or PAL), which is obvious, and that APAL + and APAL are incomparable, which is not obvious.
Proposition 5.1 Arbitrary positive announcement logic is as expressive as public announcement logic in S5 for a single agent.
Proof We recall that single-agent APAL is as expressive as S5 [3, Prop. 3.11 and 3.12]. The same proof applies to single-agent APAL + : it plays no role anywhere in the proof in [3] over what logical fragment the quantification is. Proof We refer to the proof of Proposition 2.12. Observe that the announcement q used in that proof is a positive formula. Therefore, this also shows that no epistemic formula is equivalent to the L
We now consider the relative expressivity of APAL and APAL + .
Theorem 5.3 APAL
+ is not at least as expressive as APAL for multiple agents.
. Let us assume that there is an equivalent formula ϕ ∈ L + apal . The epistemic depth of this formula is d(ϕ). We recall that the epistemic depth counts the number of stacked knowledge modalities, but ignores the arbitrary (positive) announcement modalities.
Now consider the models M s and N s in Figure 5 . 1 They are the same except that in M s the lower leg is cut off at the world named d(ϕ)
′ . This is beyond depth d(ϕ) from s,
, R a is the symmetric and reflexive closure of which will be used in the proof. The final indistinguishability link can be for b or for a. In the proof this does not matter. Without loss of generality, we assumed in the figure that it is for b.
We now successively show the following:
is equivalent to ϕ is in contradiction with these results. Therefore, no such equivalent ϕ exists. 
We can see this as follows. The denotation of
The denotation of the conjunction of these two formulas is the intersection of these two sets: {s, s ′ , 0, 0
Then, any other point in the structure is distinguished from all others by its distance from point 1 ′ . For example, 0 ′ is the unique point satisfying
and so on (there are different ways to do this systematically). To distinguish any finite collection T ⊆ S of points in the domain of M, take the disjunction of such formulas δ T := t∈T δ t . We note that δ T is true in M in all points t ∈ T and false in all points t ∈ T . When d(ϕ) > 1, we proceed similarly, by using the finite distance from point d(ϕ) ′ to the points s and s ′ where K b p is true, in order to distinguish that unique endpoint d(ϕ) ′ .
In other words, there is a formula ψ such that M s |= ψ and
2. On the other hand, N s ≃ N s ′ , N 0 ≃ N 0 ′ , etc., because the s, 0, 1, . . . chain is the mirror image of the s
firstly, any announcement must preserve actual state s and therefore also preserves s ′ ; secondly, 0 and 0 ′ are both removed by an announcement, after which K b K a p is true in s, or neither, after which K b ¬K a p is true in s.
3. We note that M s ≃ d(ϕ) N s , so the two models agree on all formulas in L el with epistemic depth less than or equal to d(ϕ). We wish to establish incomparability of APAL and APAL + , so it remains to show that APAL is not at least as expressive as APAL + . This we will do in the following Theorem 5.4. Before that theorem we will introduce the models used in its proof.
Consider the relation
Consider models M l s and N r s , both consisting of a chain . . . , s −2 , s −1 , s, s 1 , s 2 , . . . of alternating a-links and b-links wherein a variable p is false in the evaluation point s and the values of p are swapped in adjoining nodes. However, the model M l terminates on the left in point l (for left) and is infinite on the right, whereas the model N r terminates on the right in point r (for right) and is infinite on the left.
2 Figure 6 gives two examples of such models, one for l = −1 and r = 2, and the other one for |l|, r > d(ϕ), where ϕ is a fixed parameter that will be used in the proof of Theorem 5.4.
First consider models M Figure 6 . Note that in M −1 but not in N 2 : from the evaluation point s, the a-link is closer to the edge than the b-link. The formula
2 Formally, let l be a negative odd integer and let r be a positive even integer, then the domain of M l is {s i | i ∈ Z, i ≥ l}, where we identify state s with s 0 and state l with s l . Relation R a in M l is the symmetric and reflexive closure of {(s 2i−1 , s 2i ) | i ∈ Z, 2i − 1 ≥ l}, whereas R b is the symmetric and reflexive closure of {(s 2i , s 2i+1 ) | i ∈ Z, 2i > l}, and V (p) = {s 2i+1 | i ∈ Z, 2i + 1 ≥ l}. Then, the domain of N r is {s i | i ∈ Z, i ≤ r}; we now note that r plays the role of s r , and the relations and valuation in N Let us explain why. The positively definable subsets of M −1 and N 2 are: all states, all the p-states, all the ¬p-states, any finite prefix of the chain, and a union of any of the previous.
The finite prefixes of the chain M −1 are positively definable because they, and only they, are closed under refinement. We can see this by observing that (where s = s 0 and l = −1 = s −1 ) R := {(s i+2j , s i ) | j ∈ Z, i ≥ −1} is a refinement on M −1 , and that it is maximal. If we take any such M
, the latter is isomorphic to a submodel of the former. A submodel is the most typical example of the structural loss represented by a refinement. (We can alternatively see this by induction on epistemic depth using an enumeration of non-equivalent positive epistemic formulas for two agents a, b and one atom p.)
In M −1 , these prefixes are defined by the (positive) formulas:
As we build these prefixes from the left, the a-leg from s is included before the b-leg from s is included. Differently said, if the b-leg is included then the a-leg is included. And both have a different value of p than in s. This gives us L b p → L a p. And therefore, M
There, similar reasoning makes us conclude that the b-leg is always included before the a-leg. So we can make a positive announcement, namely
Of course the models M 
to have that distance explicitly in the formula, unlike in the L
This crucial observation is used in the following proof. 
The step (@) is justified as follows. The inductive hypothesis of ( * ) for ψ delivers that M ′ s ′ |= ψ iff N ′ t ′ |= ψ. However, we can similarly use the inductive hypothesis for ψ on all s ′′ resp. t ′′ within a n − d(ψ) distance from s ′ in M ′ resp. t ′ in N ′ (because, let the distance be i with 0 ≤ i ≤ n − d(ψ), then we use that d(ψ) ≤ n − i and M The relative expressivity of APAL + to group announcement logic and coalition announcement logic, mentioned in the introduction, is unclear.
Axiomatisation
In this section we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for arbitrary positive announcement logic. It is as the (infinitary) axiomatisation for arbitrary public announcement logic given by Balbiani et al. [3, 4] , but with restrictions to positive announcements in appropriate axioms. A necessity form contains a unique occurrence of the symbol ♯. If ψ(♯) is a necessity form and ϕ ∈ L + apal , then ψ(ϕ) ∈ L + apal , where ψ(ϕ) stands for the substitution of the unique occurrence of ♯ in ψ(♯) by ϕ. We also call ψ(ϕ) an instantiation of ψ(♯).
The axiomatisation APAL + ω is given below. A formula is a theorem if it belongs to the least set of formulas containing all axioms and closed under the derivation rules.
Definition 6.2 The axiomatisation APAL + ω is a substitution schema consisting of the following axioms and rules. In the rule R+ ω , the expressions χ([ψ]ϕ) and χ( + ϕ) are instantiations of a necessity form χ(♯). The axiomatisation APAL + ω is identical to the axiomatisation APAL in [3, 4] , except for the replacement of the APAL by the APAL + + on two occasions, resulting in the axiom A+ and the rule R+ ω . Other, non-essential differences are the different names for axioms and rules, for example the axiom we call K they call A1, the axiom we call T they call A4, and so on; and the presence of additional, known to be derivable, axioms in [4] . Proof The soundness of the axiomatisation is evident as the axiom A+ and the rule R+ ω follow the semantics of the + operator (just as their non-positive counterparts followed the semantics of the operator), and all remaining axioms and rules are, as well-known, standard from epistemic logic and public announcement logic.
The completeness proof proceeds exactly as in [4] , with appropriate restrictions from epistemic announcements to positive announcements in the cases of A+ and R+ ω . More precisely, the positive arbitrary announcement operator + only features in the subinductive case [ψ] + χ and in the inductive case + ψ of the proof of the Truth Lemma. The Truth Lemma for APAL is proved by a complexity measure wherein [ψ]ϕ is less complex than ϕ for any ψ ∈ L el . Similarly, [ψ]ϕ is less complex than + ϕ for any ψ ∈ L + el . This justifies that substituting 'epistemic' for 'positive' in appropriate places is sufficient.
No other changes are required.
We note that APAL + ω is an infinitary axiomatisation, as the rule R+ ω requires an infinite number of premises. Just as for the infinitary axiomatisation of the logic APAL, it is unknown if a finitary axiomatisation exists.
Conclusion
We presented a variant of arbitrary public announcement logic called positive arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL + , which restricts arbitrary public announcements to announcement of positive formulas. We showed that the model checking complexity of APAL + is PSPACE-complete, that APAL + is more expressive than public announcement logic PAL, that it is incomparable with APAL, and we provided a sound and complete infinitary axiomatisation. The proof of the decidability of APAL + is reported in a companion paper [24] .
